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Cert to Ct App Oregon 
(Schwab, Foley; Fort dissenting) 
State-criminal 
.Timely 
1. Petr challenges a condition of pr.obation requiring hi.m 
to reimburse the county for the cost of his court-appointed 
attorney's fees. 
2. FACTS, Petr entered a guilty plea to an information 
charging him with third degree .sodomy. Petr had no prior 
convictions, except for a misdemeanor trespass. The judge 




five years' probation with the following conditions, 
(1) That defendant be confined to Multnomah 
County ~orrectional Institution for a period 
of one year, said confinement to allow defendant 
to continue school; and, 
'1 (2) That defendant pay the cost of his attorney's 
~ ~ees a~d $375 for the cost of the defense attorney's 
1nvest1gator. 
Petr appealed to the Court of Appeals of Oregon. The~rt 
ruled that the Oregon statute;1authorizing the imposition of such 
costs did not violate petr's Sixth Amendment· right to counsel 
and did not deny him Equal Protection of the law. -----
The court reasoned that the assessment of costs under the 
statute, to include attorney's fees, did not deprive a defendant 
of Sixth Amendment rights because the statute is not mandatory 
and because discretion always resides in the court to determine 
' . 
ability to pay, The court was impressed that the statutes required 
a showing that a defendant "is or will be able to pay costs" and 
that, in assessing costs, a court must consider "the nature of 
the burden that payment of costs will impose~' including "manifest 
hardship on the defendant or his immediate family." 
The court distinguished this Court's recent decision in 
James Y..!., Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), in which a Kansas recoup-
ment statute was invalidated on Equal Protection grounds because 
it denied exemptions from execution afforded to other judgment 
.,,.,_ I 
debto'rs. No such distinct ions are drawn in the Oregon statute. 
The court also held that the possibility of parole revocation 
for nonpayment of costs did not unduly discriminate against 
defendants because such revocation can occur only in sharply 
~/ The statutes are attached to this memo. 
''::_./ The Court reserved the question in this case. "Whether the 
statutory obljr:;ations for rep:iymcnt irnpermissi.li]y deter the exercise 
of rthc ri~ht to counsel] is a question we need not rcAch, for we 





Judge Fort dissented. He adopted the view taken by 
the California Supreme Court that recoupment "constitutes 
an impediment to the free exercise of a right guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment." In £!2. Allen, 71 Cal,2d 388, 78 Cal. Rptr 
207, 455 P.2d 143, cert denied, 396 U.S. 994 (1969). Judge 
Fort noted that this recoupment statute, unlike the Kansas 
statute in James, is a part of the criminal process. As such, 
it could well inhibit a defendant, particularly in matters 
carrying a lesser penalty, fran exercising to the full the 
rights guaranteed to him not only under the Sixth Amendment 
but also under concepts of funda~ental fairness enshrined in 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. "In my view it constitutes 
an invidious discrimination between the indieent defendant and 
the well-to-do defendant." Judge Fort also would hold the 
statute unconstitutional under James because "nothing in the 
challenged statute here affords the defendant in a revocation 
pro~eeding to the exemptions provided debtors generally under 
Oregon law," 
Petr qppealed to the Supreme Court of Oregon which denied 
his petition for review on May 22, 1973. 
3. CONTENTION S1 
A. Petr raises the point that the statute is no 
different from the one in James and does not afford exemptions 
provided other debtors generally under Oregon law. 
B. Petr also contends that the statute is patently 
unconstitutional in that it applies only to indigent defendants 
who have been convicted of crime, and does not apply to those 
( '\ 
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indigent defendants who, although they may have been represented 
by court-appointed counsel, were fortunate enough to have 
their cases dismissed or who were acquitted after trial by 
jury. Petr cites Rinaldi Y...!.. Yeager, 384- U.S. 305 (1966). In 
the Yeager case, this Court held unconstitutional a New 
Jersey statute that authorized county treasurers to recover 
costs incurred in preparing a trial transcript for indigent 
defendants incarcerated in state institutions. Indigent defendants nc 
incarcer~ted in these institutions were not required to pay. The 
Court held that "[t]o fasten a financial burden only upon those 
unsuccessful appellants who are confined in state institutions ••• 
is to make an invidious discri.mination. 11 
C. Petr finally alleges a denial of his Sixth Amendment 
rights. He relies on In re Allen, where the California Supreme~ 
Court reasoned, 
[w]e believe that as knowledge of this practice 
has grown and continues to grow many indigent 
defendants will come to rAalize that the judge's 
offer to supply counsel is not the gratuitous 
offer of assistance that it might appear to be; 
that, in the event the case results in a grant of 
probation, one of the conditions might well be the 
reimbursement of the county for the expense 
involved. This knowledge is quite likely to deter 
or discourage many defendants from accepting the 
offer of counsel despite the gravity of the need 
for such representation as emphasized by the 
Court in Gideon. 
Petr analogizes the effect generated by the Oregon statute 
to cases where statutory provisions have been held to deter 
defendants in their exercise of the Fifth Amendment right 
'against self-incrimination. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 
570 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Sanitation 
Men Assoc. v. Commissionerp 392 U.S. 280 (1968)1 Griffin v. 
( 
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California , 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
Petr asserts that in order to be consistent 
with the Oregon court ruling, any time a criminal indigent 
defendant is advised of his Miranda rights, he should also 
be advised that should he be convicted, he may well have to 
reimburse the county for the costs of his court appointed 
attorney's fees. 
4. DISCUSSION, I would note first that there is no ' .? 
response to this petition. Petr's claim that the Oregon 
statute is no different from the one in James, all things 
being equal, may not hold water since the statute, as construed 
by the majority, does not contain the infirmity found in James. 
The statutes are not similar, however, in that James involved 
a civil statute and the one here is part of the criminal 
process, perhaps rendering a more direct impact on those 
defendants who are indigents. 
The distinction drawn between convicted and nonconvicted 
indig~nts may not be so unreasonable as it sounds at first 
glanceo An indigent wrongfully brought to the bar of justice 
should not be expected to bear the burden of paying for the 
state's mistakes, The statute here, moreover, is not mandatory, 
and is grounded on an ability to pay, 
-------- ---- ---------The real question is whether knowledge of possibly forced 
payment of attorney's fees will, in fact or in all probability, 
deter or discourage a defendant from accepting the offer of 
counsel to which he is entitled if he is indigent and charged 
with a crime. 
Again, there is no response, 
10/18/73 Knicely Op Ore Ct App i.n 
Petr' s A PDX, 


























S.taL .. v. Full.er 
FOOTNOTES 
ORS 16l.G65 provides: 
"(1) The court may require a con-
victed defendant to pay costs. 
"(2) Costs shall be limited to expenses 
specially incurred by the state in prosecuting 
the defendant. They cannot include expenses 
inherent in providing a constitutionally 
guaranteed jury trial or expenditures ' in 
connection with the main~enance and operation 
of government agencies that must be made by 
the public irrespective of specific viola-
tions of law. 
"(3) The court shall not sentence a 
defendant to pay costs unless the defendant 
is or will be able to pay them. In deter-
mining the amount and method of payment of 
costs, the court shall take account of the 
financial resources of the defendant and the 
nature of the burden that payment of costs 
will impose. 
n(4) A defendant who has been sentenced 
to pay costs and who is not in contumacious 
def~ult in the payment thereof may at any 
time petition the court which sentenced him 
for remission of the payment of costs . or of 
any unpaid portion thereof. If it appears 
to the satisfaction of the court that payment 
of the amount due will impose manifest hard-
ship on the defendant or his immediate family, 
the court may remit all or part of the amount 
due in costs, or modify the method of payment 
under ORS 161.675. 11 
ORS 161.675 provides: 


























"(l} When a defendant is sentenced 
to· pay a fine or costs, the court may grant 
permission for payment to be made within a 
specified period of time or in specified 
instalments. If no such permission is in-
cluded in the sentence the fine sh~ll be 
payable forthwith. 
"(2} When a defendant sentenced to pay 
a fine or costs is also placed on probation 
or imposition or execution of sentence is 
suspended, the court may make payment of the 
fine or costs a condition of probation or 
suspension of sentence." 
ORS 161.685 provides: 
"(1} When a defendant sentenced to pay 
a fine defaults in the payment thereof or of 
any instalment, the court on motion of the 
district attorney or upon its own motion may 
require him to show cause why his default 
should not be treated as contempt of court, 
and may issue a show cause citation or a 
·warrant of arrest for hi~ appearance. 
11 (2} Unless the defendant shows that 
his default was not attributable to an in-
tentional refusal to obey the order of the 
court or to a failure on his part to make a 
good faith effort to make·the payment, the 
court may find that his default constitutes 
contempt and may order'him committed until 
the fine, or a specified part thereof, is 
paid. 
·u (3} When a fine is imposed on a cor-
poration or unincorporated association, it 
is the duty of the person authorized to make 
disburseme nt from the assets of the corpora-
tion or association to _pay the fine from 
those assets, and his failure to do so may 
be held to be contempt unless he makes the 
showing required in subsection (2) of this 
section. 
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"(4) The term of imprisonment for con-
tempt for nonpuyment of fines shall be set 
£:9rth in the commitment order, and shall not 
exceed one day for each $25 of the fine, . 30 
days if the fine was imposed upon conviction 
of a violation or misdemeanor, or one year 
in any other case, whichever is thci shorter 
period. A person committed for nonpayment of 
a fine shall be given credit toward payment 
for each day of imprisonment at the rate 
specified in the commitment order. 
"(5) If it appears to the satisfaction 
of the court that the default in the payment 
of a fine is not contempt, the court may 
enter an order allowing the defendant addit-
ional time for payment, reducing the .amount 
thereof or of each instalment or revoking 
the fine or the unpaid portion thereof in 
whole or in part. 
"(6) A default in the payment of a fine 
or costs or any instalment thereof may be 
collected by any means authorized by law for 
the enforcement of a judgment. The levy of 
execution for the collection of a fine shall 
not discharge a defendant committed to im-
prisonment for contempt until the amount of 
the fine has actually been collected." 
ORS 137.180 provides: 
"A judgment that the defendant pay money, 
either as a fine or as costs and disbursements 
of the action, or both, shall be docketed as 
a judgment in a civil action and with like 
effect, as provided in ORS 18.320, 18.350 and 
18.400." 
ORS 137.450 provides: 
. 



























"A judgment against the defendant in 
a criminal action or the private prose-
cutor, so far as it requires the payme nt 
of a fine or costs and disbursements of 
the action, or both, may be enforced as a 
judgment in a civil action." 
tis clear from the Proposed cr{minal Code, § 80, 
pp 76 , that the Criminal Law Revision Commission in-
tended -he "costs" defined in ORS 161.665(2) include the 
costs of legal assistance furnished an indigent. Forme r 
ORS 137.2 provided for taxation against a 'defendant for _ 
the cost o 16gal assistance furnished to him, and the 
Proposed Cri inal Code states, see Table, p XXV, that the 
intent of the Commission was that the substance of forme r 
ORS 137.205 be retained by placing it in what is now ORS 
161. 665 (2). 
5 
6 
ORS 137.540(10) rovides: 
"The court sh 
at any time modify, 
probation, which may 
any others, that the 
1 determine, and may 
he conditions of 
·nclude, as well as 
p obationer shall: 
or restitu-u (10) Make reparati 
tion to the aggrieved part 
or loss caused by offense, 
be determined by the court." 
for the damage 
an amount to 
The opinion of the California Suprem Court indicat e s 
that at least as of the date of that opini California 
had no recoupme nt· statutes similar to Oregon's. 
"The condition of probation under 
attack is the requirement ~hat the petition r 
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V-r~~ l.V\-~ P~t2t;._,_ 
i\lnr:-:11:tll, .T. /c..eA:..~ )-..(2_ 
£1-z.-,___ -~f-__ 
/µL_:f- ~'"l-t½ ~ i;)_Lf' • 
' 
() ___ ---:----~~:-;--;~~~~~ 
P ell J /.:fU-_ .. , ,.>.....;;; Rehnquist, J. /l_/J~ ~ ow ' . _t,.,,L-- . r-r - - -__z_ --
() ) _,, 
·-
What in the world is "invidious 
discrimination?• Obviously its a 
talisman to be employed in place 
of legal analysis. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr ·. Justice Dou~las 
Mr. Justice irennan 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice ilackmun 
The result he,re may be right, 
although the question is very close 
after Rinaldi and your James opinion, 
407 U.S. 128. But the pamcity of 
analysis is very troubling. I think 
-~~M~~ ..... Justice Powell 
Xr. Justice Rehnquist 
you should review 2nd DRAFT 
your James opinion and consilder From: Stewa.rt, J · 
a short co~~~~!~e ?OURT_O_F_TH_E UNITED §IA!ffied: -'-'-'M'-'-'AY'---B __ 19_7_~ _ 
The tension between 
this and James ought 
to be addressed and 
No. 73-5280 Recirculated: ______ _ 
resolved Prince Eric Fuller,) 
by the Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of 
author of v. Appeals of Oregon. 
James• State of Oregon, 
Jack [May -, 1974J 
MR. JUSTICE Bn,; wAH'l' dehvered t,he oprn1ou of the 
Court, 
In this case we are called upon to determine whether 
Oregon may co11stitutionally require a person convicted 
of a criminal offense to repay to the State the costs of 
providing him with effective representation of counsel, 
when he is indigent at the time of the criminal proceed-
ings but subsequently acquires the means to bear the 
costs of his legal defense. 
The petitioner Fuller plt>aded ~uilty, on July 20, 1972, 
to an information chargi11g him with sodomy in tlw third 
degree.1 At the hearing on the plea and ill otlwr conrt 
proceedings he was represented by a local member of the 
bar appointed by th<' court upon thP petitioner's 
representation that he was indigent a11d unable to hire 
a lawyer. Fuller's counsel in turn hired a.n investigator 
to aid in gathering facts for his defern:e, and the i11vei"t1 .. 
gator's fees were also a>'snme<l by the "'tat,• Full(•r \, .... ~ 
subsequently sentenced to fivP years of probation condi-
tioned upon his satisfactorily complying with the require~ 
ments of a work-release program at the county jail that 
1 Other charges contained in the information agai11:,t Fuller wcrt' 
dismis:,ed when his guilty plea wa;; aece1Jted. 
' ',,;., 
. .. . 
2 
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FULLER v. OREGON 
would permit him to attend college, and also upon his 
reimbursement to the county of the fees and expenses of 
the attorney and investigator whose services had been 
provided him because of his indigeut status. On appeal 
to the Oregon Court of Appeals, his principal contention 
was that the State could 11ot constitutionally condition 
his probation on the repayrnent of these expenses! With 
one judge dissenting, the imposition of his sentence was 
affirmed, ~ Ore. App. - , 504 P. 2d 1323, and the 
Supreme Court of Oregon subseq1w11tl) r!Pnied F11ll11r'i-: 
petition for revww - On• -, - - P. ~d --. B<'-
cause of the importanc<' of tllP q1wstion pn'1:,entcd nncl 
the conflict of opinion on the constitutional issue 
involved,3 we gran ted cert iorari, - U. S. . 
I 
We b<>gin with consideration of the pl a.11 all(! operat1011 
of the challenged statute. By force> of i11terpretat10u or 
2 ln addit ion, Fuller arg11ni that tllC' ,;c•c·tion of the Orpµ:011 J\c·o11p-
mcnt ~tat ute a11thonzing an ohligM1011 to rq>: y ·p:,,.p('I\~<'~ ~IH'<·i.ill) 
incurred h,\' t he• ,;tat<• in pro~Pe11ting t lw ddPnd:111t," On• HPv Ht:d 
§ 161.655 (2), srt' n. ,5, mfrn, wa~ 11 01 mt< ndPtl b) thl' :,,L1tr lrg;1~lat11r-0 
to mcludc roun~el fpps, Thb b~ll(' of ,ta te law wa,, rr:,:olvr•d agaiu,,t 
the pct it ionc•r m tllf' 8tatr ('Oil r t , :L11 d pro1wrl~ i,.. not rai~Pd lwrl\, 
Murdock v. Cit !! of Mcrr1phis, 87 ll. 8. (:.!0 Wall.) :190 
a Court,- or :,:omc' othPr Stat(·~, in reviP\l'mg 1t,g1slat10n ,irnilar to 
that in que:;t1011 hrn>, havt' exprl'~~Pd v1Pw" on the• r·or1~titutionalitr 
of thr l'C'C'OU]llllt'llt of dt•fr11~(' ('0~1, lll('Oll~i,tNH \\'Ith hl' dr('Mllll of 
thP OrPgon Court or Appral8 ill thi~ ('a,P. fil n,· ,llle11, i] Cal. '.2cl 
388, 78 Cal , Rptr. 207 , 455 P :.!(I l·ta; 07m11011 uj the Justin", JOH 
N. H. 508, 256 A. '.!d /)()0; State c.r r<'f. Rrn11daqe v. Hide, - Wa,11, 
-, - I'. :.!d -- (?-,;o -l'.!,9\l.5 \p1. ., UJH). 'r ./a1111s 
Stranae, 32;{ F . Supp. 112:m (Ka11. ), aff'd 011 ot her ground,, m7 l'. S, 
128. SeP genrrally, A. B. A., Project on Providing Defrn~e S<'rvH·r,;, 
58- 59 (Approv<'d D n 1ft 1968) ; Comment, RC"1mbur~ement of De-
fense Cost,; a~ a Condit 1011 of Proba tion for Imligent~, fi7 )Iirh L. 
Rev . 140-l (1969 ) ; ~ c>tr>, C ha rgmg Co~t :,: of Pro~pru1ion to tlw l)(.1, 
fendant, 59 Geo. L . .T. U91 (Hl71 ). 
73-5280-0PIN'ION 
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,the State's Constitution and comprehensive legislation , 
Oregon mandates that every defendant in a criminal case 
tnust be assigned a lawyer at state expense if "li]t 
a.ppears to the court that the defendant is without means: 
and is unable to obtain counsel." Ore. Rev. Stat. ~ 133, 
,625."' As part of a recoupment statute passed in 1971~ 
rOregon requires that in some cases all or part of the 
"expenses specially incurred by the state in prosecuting 
the defendant" be repaid to the State, a·nd that when a 
convicted person is plar<>cl 011 prohation rc-pay1n~11t of 
such expenses may be rnadP a comhtio11 o probation.' -4 Ore'. RC'v. Stat.§ J:3:3Ji25 (a) (2 ) direct" thnt eotm~d lw ,IJJpo111t<·J 
for an indigrut dC'fendant whru lw it-1 " I <" I hnrgC'd with a crim" fol 
which a fr lony ,-p11t<0 J1Cl' could lw 1111poHPd," Ot·P. Hev. Htat § 1!il.5!l!i 
define:,, a mi~demrauor a~ a ,·mm• for whl<'h a c·om,i<"tPd ddt•wlanl 
may be ~t'ntenl·Pd to a, mu<"h :i, on,, \'l':tr 111 pri~on. ..;, t' ,ii 'O Un 
Hev. Stat.§ Wl.015 Tlw <·xtP11t1011 ot tlH' rI!};ht to <·01111~<·1 to 1ho,, 
chargPd with any enmr wns a<'<·ompli~hrd b~· tlw S11prcnw Co11r1 of 
Orrgon in 8tevcnso11 v. llolzma11. 254 Ore', 04, 4GH l' 2d 414 (Hlfi\J) 
th us tsati:sfymg in advaiH·P tlw t'<•q11in•me11t~ of Aroers111r;er \. I/om/in, 
407 u. S 25 
r, On•. Hev. Stat.§ ltil.H05 providl·s. 
" ( 1) T lw C'Ollrt ma~· n'qnt!'<' a <·011viC"t('({ d<·frndant to pa_, <·o.,t,-; 
"(2) Cost,; 1:,lrnll lw lunit<·d to <' '])<·11,-t,~ ~1><·<·1:dl~ llH'lll'l'<'d h~· th< 
t<tate in pro;;C'cut Ill/,! t lw d<•i'Pndant. Th<')' <"a nnot lll<'l 11dP <'XI 'l'n,r·, 
inhl•n•nt 111 prondmg a con~t 1t 11t ton a 11, g11:i ra ntPPd .1 tlf) t nal or I' 
pPnditlll'l',< Ill C'Ollll\'('1!011 with tllP m,IIt1tt•JJall('(' :\lid O])PlallOII ot )',Ol-
emme11 t HgPnew ... that n111~t l>l· tnadl• by th<' 1n1hlH· 1rrespl·<·t 1\ <' ot 
SJJ<'<·1fic v1olatwrn, of la\1 
" (3) ThP court :shall not srutPllC'<' a defendant to pa~· co,,ts uni<•,-,-. 
the dC'foudant is or will bC' ablP to pa~· tlwm. Tn t!C'trrmining tlw 
amoun t and mPt ho<l of paymmt of <'OHt:s, the court ~hall tnkr ae<·ount 
of the financial rP~o11n°(\• of th<' cl<·fPndant and thP nature• ot th, 
burdrn that paymPnt or rost~ will mqll>~<· 
" ( 4) A ddr11dant who has lw<'n sr11 t(•11c·Pd to pay <'Ost:, and who i8 
not in contumaciou:, dPfonlt m thr paymPnt tlH r<•of nrn.1· ,,t au, 
time pPt1t1011 till' t·ot11t wlrn·h ,-i•11tp111·<;d him tor rrrni~~io11 ot tin 
paymPnt of co,t~ or of an~ unpaid port1<>n tlH•rpof lf 1t apJl(':1r., to 
the' ~at 1~fact10n of th~· <0011rt thut pa,nnl'nt of tbP ,1rno1111t dn" will 
impo~c· manifeist hardship on the• 'c!Pflo1idiii1t or h1:-; 1mmPdrntt• fomJI), 
73-5280-0PINION 
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These expenses include the costs of the convicted per-
son's legal defense. 6 
As the Oregon a.ppellate court uoted in its opinion in 
this case, however, ~:e r~cr1i!·en~ nt -2! i;,_epae ent "~ 
the court may remit all or part of the amount duP in ('Osts, or modit'y 
the method of payment under Ore. Rev. Stat. § Hil.675." 
Ore. Rev. Stat.§ IGUi75 provides : 
"( l) When a defendant i8 sentenced lo pay a fine or costs, tht~ 
court may grant permission for payment to be made within a spec-
ified period of time or in specified instalments. U no ~uch pennis, 
~ion ls included in the sentrnc<• the fine ~hall lw pa~·ablP forthwith. 
"(2) When a defendant ~entem·Pd io pay a fine or eosts is also 
placed 0~4robatlo11 or irnpo,itlon or (•XP<·ution of ~Pnle11ce is ~n~-
=:r -• ' k . I f' dJ JJeuueu, t e COllrt may ma'(' payment ol' t le me OJ Co~tb a COil " 
tiol_!- _of probntiou or:,_i:;qspenRion of ~entern·<i." ·· 
Ore. RPv. Stat.§ 161.GSS 1,rovld.Ps. 
" ( l) When a. defrndant S('nt<'ll<'C'fi to pa~ a firw defa11lt~ in tlrn 
payment thereof or of any inst al nwnt, 1 h1 ('01n·1 on mot ion of I ht• 
district attornry or upon it8 own motion may r<'quin• him to ~hO\~ 
cause why his ckl'ault should not be trc,atc•d a~ contPm:pt of eourt, 
and may J:;:;rn~ a Hhow cau~P ch at ion or n wanant of arr('st; for hls 
appearance. 
"(2) Unless till' ddPndallt show~ that hi~ d<'iauh wa,, not attrihut-
able to an l 1t eutioua I refu8al to ()il<'\ tlw ordc•r of the co11r1 or to 
a failure 011 his pan to ma'!' a goo~ fuilh 1·li'nr1 to makr lh, r,a,-
ment , the court may find that bis dl'fa11lt ,·011~rl1~~tPmp1 and 
mny ord<~r hnn committed until the ti11e,~u"'a :-:pe<"ifl,•d p:irt tl11·rPoi' , 
is 1mid. 
"(3) ,vhPn :1 fin<· iH imposed on a corporatlo11 or 1111i11corporaiPd 
asr,ociation, it is the duty of the per~Oll a ut horizt•d to make dis. 
bursement from the as~ets of the corporation or association to pay 
the fine from those assets, nnd his failure to do so inn~· be held to 
be contrmpt unlP~~ he nrnke~ the ,-bowing rc·quir<'d i11 ,;11bst>ctio11 (2) 
of this ~cction . 
" ( 4) The term of impri,;onm<'llt for eontemp1 for no11pn_vment of 
thrns 8hall be ,;et forth m tlw (·ommitmc'n! order, and ,;hall uo1 t,xc<'ecl 
one day for each $25 of t.lw fow, :JU days if 1 hr fin<' w11~ unpo~ed upon 
conviction of a violation or mi,;denwanor. or OIH' year in an~ oillPI" 
PflSO, whichever b the shortt'r [Wriod . 1\ p11r~on commit 11,rf for uoi,-. 
[lfootuote 6' i8 on p, f) 
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il~ver mandator " - Ore. App., at -, 504 P. ~ci, ~ 
a · 13. 5. Rather, several conditions must be satisfied 
before a perSbh may be required to repay the costs of his ~· IO tl 
legal defense. First, a requirement of repayment may &7"""~ 
be imposed only upon a convicted defendant; those whd v - .. ~ 
are acquitted, whose trials end i11 mistrial or dismissal, ~ /.,1---
and those whose convictions are overturned upon appeal ~~ -
face no possibility of being required to pay. Ore. Rev. .--" ~ 
Stat. § 161.665 (1) . Recond, a court may not order a(k---:._..~ 
convicted person to pay tlwi-,11 ( 1xpc, 1~<'~ unl<'ss I< 1 llr ~- · ' 
will be able to pay them." On'. R<'v Stat. ~ lOUH,r, i a; 
The sentencing court must "ta,kc ac•cotm t of the financrn,l I 
resources of the defendant and the nature of the bur<lrn 
that payment of costs will ' impo~e.'' ibid. As the 
Oregon court put the matter in this case, no requirement 
to repay may be imposed if it appears at .the time of 
sentencing that "there is no likelihood that a defendant's 
indigency will end .... '' 504 P. 2d, at l:3!i7 Third, a. 
convicted person under an obligation to repay "may at ( 
any time pctit10n the court \\ hich ~<'11te11c~d him fo 
remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid por .. 
tion thereof.'' Ore. RP,· Stm ~ 161.6fi5 (4 ). Th( 
court is empowPrcd to renut if payment ''will irnpol:'C 
P•t 'ment of a fine ~hall b<· ~ivcn rred11 toward pa~ llll'll( for \':1d1 dny 
of imprisonment at the rat<' "pecified 111 1he commitme11t order. 
"(5) If it appear" to thr ,;a11~faetwn of the c•ourt that tlw dl'falll1 
in the payment of a fine i,, not eont(•mpt, the court ma~· 1•nt<'r ail 
order allowmg thr drfcndant ndd1tional tinw tor paYnwnt, ml11('111g 
the amount thereof or of <'a<'h in"talme11t 01· rcYokmg the till(' or the 
unpaid J>ortio11 thrrcof m whole or 111 part . 
"(6) A default in the paymPnt of a fmP or l'O"t" or auy in,-talmr,nt 
thereof may be collectrd by any mra11~ authorized b~· law for tlw en-
forcemrnt of a judgment. Thl• levy of l'Xl'<'Htlon for thr ('Olll'elion 
· of a fine sb~ ot di,;drnrge a drfrndant 1·omrr11tt<'d to imprNmml•nt 
i' ,. 
·for contempt 1111til the amotmt of the fiJw ha,- actt11tlly been collect1-d." 
6 See n. ·2, illpra. 
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manifest hardshi his immediate 
family . ... " lbia. ma y, no convicte person may ' 
beJicld in contempt for failure to repay if he shows that 
"his ctefautt= w:S not attributable to an intentional l 
refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure on 
his part to make a good faith effort to make pay-
ment .... " Ore. Rev. Stat. ~ 161.685. 
Thus, the recouprnent statute is quite clearly directed 
only at those convicted defendants who are indigent at 
the time of the criminal proceedings against them but who 
subsequently gain the ability to pay the expenses of legal 
representation. Defendants with no likelihood of having 
the means to repay are not put under <'VPII a condit10 11al 
obligation to do so, and thOf'l' upon "horn a conchtional 
obligation is imposed are not subjected to collection pro• 
cedures until their indigency has ended and no "manifost 
hardship" will result. The contrast with appointment 
of counsel procedures i;1 States without recoupment 
requirements 7 is thus relatively small: a lawyer is pro-
vided at the expense of the State to all defendants who ( 
are unable, even momentarily, to hire one, and the obli-
gation to repay the State accrues only to those who later 
acquire the mea11s to do so without hardship. 
11 
The petitioner's first con ten t101, is that Oregon 's 
recoupment system violates the ~~~ecti~!! Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment because of varwusc!assi-
fications explicitly or irnplicity ~ -iegis"liitiv~ 
pro v1s1ons. He calls attention too'i'u ""'le'Msion in J"iiiiic;J 
v. "'Str<fnge, 407 F. S. 128. which held imalid under tllf' 
7 The recoupment provision;- of ot hPr State" arP ~t out in the 
Court's opinion in James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128, 13:!-133 allC! n. 8, 
The federal rcimbur8emcnt provi,1011 i~ found at 18 U S. C. 
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Equal Protection Clause a law enacted by Kansas that 
was somewhat similar to the legislation now before us. 
But the offending aspect of the Kansas statute was its 
~ - - ----provision that m an action to compel repayment of 
counsef fe~ "[n]one of the exemptions provided in the 
code of civil procecli'.ire [forcoilectloii of other Jiidg;~;nt 
debts j sTiaii' arr,ly to any ~~~~ineilt: ... "'""'~Kans. 
Stat. Ann~ -45f'S1aTTSupp. 1971), a provision which 
"strip [ped] from the indigent defendants the array of 
protective exemptions Kansas has erecter! for other civil 
judgment dehtors . " 407 U. S., at mo The Court 
found that the elimination of the exemptions normally 
available to judgment debtors "embodie[dl elements of 
punitiveness and discrimination which violate the rights 
of citizens to equal treatment under the law." Td., at 
142 
The Oregon statute under cons1derat10n hen• ~uffen, 
from no such infirmity. .\s the Oregon CourtofAppe~ 
ubset vect,-"No clemal of the exelllptions from execution \ ·'I ~/ 
afforded to otfier judgment deotors 1s 111 cludecl in tlw Y 
Oregon statutes':' - Ore. ~--"=, 504 f5. 2c( at 
1397:' 1nueed, a separa.te provision directs that "[a] 
judgment that the defendant pay money, either as a fine 
or as costs and disbursements of the action, or both, shall 
be docketed as a judgment i11 a civil action and with like 
effect . . .'' OrP. Rc•v. :-;tat ~ 1:n l~O. ThP eo11n<'t.pd 1 
person frorn whom recoupnwnt is sought thus retains all 
the exemptions accorded other judgment debtors, m mlcli-
tion to the opportunity to show at any time that recovery 
of the costs of his legal defense will impose "manifest 
hardship," ante, pp. 5-6. The legislation before us, there .. 
8 The Kansas statute allowed only one exception from the blanket 
denial of exemptions nsually nvailnblr to judgment debtorH, f)<'l'-
mitting debtor:;: upon whom jndgm<•nt~ for eo,;t~ of l<•gal dpfp1,~t! 
were executcxj to maintain thqr home~tends intact, Id., at la5. 
'· 
,, . ' ;.,, 
'•"" 
.• ,"' 
' . ' 
,, 
~ ... 
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fore, is wholly free of the kind of discrimination that was 
held in James v. Strange to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The ~ itioner contends fur ther, however, that tho 
Oregon stat ute denies equal protection of the_ laws in 
a1wther way -0ychscnm111atrng between defend~ o 
a~ ted, on the one hand, and those who are not 
convicted or whose convictions are reversed, on the other. 
Our review of this distinction, of course, is a limited one. 
As the Court stated James v. Strange, supra, "We do not 
'Wquire whether this statute is ,, is< or desirable ... , I 
Misguided laws may nonetlwk1-s h<' con13titutioual" 407 
· U. S., at 133. Our task is merely to determine whetlwr 
there is "some rationality in the nature· of the dass 
singled out." Rinaldi , rra11Pr.. 3~4 e. s. ;{05, :ms. 
309. See also McGinnis ,. Hoy.sfPr, 410 TT. S. 2G3, 
McGowan v. 1v.laryland, 366 l'. S 420. In Hinnldi the -----Court found impermissible New .Jersey's decision to 
single out prisoners confined to state institutions for 
imposition of an obligation to repay to the State costs 
incurred in providing free transcripts of trial court pro-
ceedings required by this Court's decision in Grijfi'II v. 
Illinois, 351 U. S. 12. The legislatiw deci:,ion to ta .· 
those confined to prison hut not those also co11vict<·d 
but given a suspended sentence, probation, or a fine 
without imprisonmeut was found to lw !2;._Vidiou :tLv dis-
criminatory and thus violative of the requirements of 
the Equal Protection Clause. In the case before us, 
however, the sole distinction is between those who are 
ultimately convicted and those who are not." 
0 The petitioner also clanm m hi,, brirf that a n•quirrmcnt to rrpa_\ 
legal defensr expem;rs has been imposrd onlr on eonv1eted drfendanti-
placed on probation , and "hai:; not be<'n applied to tho,.;e convicted 
indigents who were sentencrd to tNm~ of imprisomnrnt." Whilr (hi~ 
distinction might well be just1fi<'d ou till' gro1111d 1 bat those rdeaHed 
on probation arc more likely thmi tho~r incarcerated to lrnve t!HJ 
', . . 
' . 
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We conclude that this classification is wholly non-
invidious. A defendant whose trial ends without con-
viction or whose conviction is overturned on appeal has 
been seriously imposed upon by society without any 
conclusive demonstration that he is criminally culpable. 
His life has been interrupted and subjected to great stress, 
and he may have incurred financial hardship through 
loss of job or pote11tial working hours. His reputation 
may have been greatly damaged. The imposition of 
such dislocations and hardships without an ultimatl' c< 11 
viction is, of course. unavoiclabln in a lpgal system thut 
requires proof of guilt bPyond n reasonable doubt and 
guarantees important procedural protections to every 
defendant in a criminal trial. But Oregon could surely 
decide with objective rationality that when a defendant 
has been forced to submit to a criminal prosecution that 
does not end in conviction, he will be freed of any po-
tential liability to reimburse the State for the costs of his 
defense. This legislative c.k•cisiou reflects 110 more than 
an effort to achieve elemf•ntal fairne8s and 1s a for rry 
from the kind of invidious discrimrnation that thl, Equal 
Protection Clause condemns. 111 
ability to rarn money to rqwy, WP need not reach thi:- iH~II(' 8inl'e 
the statute itself makes no such distinction, and t IH' pet 1tio1wr has 
not demollstrated 011 this record that th<' Statr ha,; engagrd in any 
pattern or practice embracmg it. 
10 The petitioner'~ brirf a],;o raisr,;, without extended d1scu~:,;ion, 
various due proces~ claim::, t h;t 1111po~1tion of the c·ond1trnrn1l obli-
gation to repay wa8 made without ~umciPut. notH·<· or lwarii1g. Siw·e 
these contentrnn;; appear not to have bren ra1~<'d 111 tlw :-tall' comtH, 
and were not di8c11s;;rd by tlw On,gon Comt of Appeab, W<' llP<'d not 
rc>ach them her€'. "[TJhis Court hnH statt'd that when . . tlw 
highe:st state court ha,; failed to pas:; upon a fedNal question, it 
will be a8~umed that the omi,;s10n was due to want of proper prrs-
entation in the 8tate courts, unlc88 the ng!(rieved party in tl11s Court 
ran affirmatively ,;how the contrary." Strl'<'t ,. Nett' York, 394 l. S 
576. 582 W<' notP in pa~~ing, IH>WPvrr, that th(' rN·oHpment ~tat, 
10 
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The petitioner's second basic contention is that 
·Oregon's recoupment statute infringes upon his consti-
tutional right to have counsel provided by the State when 
he is unable because of indigency himself to hire a 
lawyer. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Arger-
singer v. H arnlin, 407 U. S. 25. The argument is not that 
the legal representation actually provided in this case 
was illeffective or insufficieu t, Nor does the petitioner 
claim that the fees and expenses he may have to repay 
constitute unreasonable cornpensat10n for the defeusc 
provided him. Rather, he asserts that a defendant's 
knowledge that he may remain uuder an obligatio11 to 
repay the expeuses incurred i11 providillg him legal rPpr<·-
sentation might impel hirn to declille the st•rvices of au 
a,pvointed attorney and thus "chill" lrn, co11st1tutiollctl 
right to counsel. 
This view was articulated by the 1Supreme Court of 
California, in a case invalidating California's recoup-
ment legislation, in the following terms: 
"[W] e believe that as knowledge of I the recoup .. 
ment] practice has grown and continues to grow 
many i11dige11t defenda11ts will com<· to reaJi,w that 
the judge's offer to supply eounsf'I _is not tlw gratui .. 
tous offer of assistarH'P that it might app<>ar to be: 
that, in the event, the case results in a grant of pro .. 
bation, oue of the conditions nught we]] be the reim-
bursement of the county for the expeBse iuvo]ved. 
This knowledge is quite likely to deter or discourage 
many defendants from accepting the off er of counsel 
tttes, including a ;;ehrclule of fee~. were publishrd in the Oregon 
Revised Statute;; at tlw time of 11w pd it 1orwr'~ plea, and further 
that both Oregon'~ judgnwnt PX<'eut10n ~tat11tp and her parole revo, 
cation pro('edure~ providr for a !waring beforl' <>xt•rution can be, 
levied or probation revoked, 
. 
•, 
' ,. . ,, 
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despite the gravity of the need for such representa-
tion as emphasized by the lSuprerne] Court in 
Gideon .... " 
In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388. -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207, -, 
455 P. 2d 143. We have concluded that this reasoning 
is wide of the constitutional mark. 
The focal point of this Court's decisions securing the 
right to state-appointed counsel for indigents was the 
"noble ideal" that every criminal defendant be assured 
not only "procedural and substantive safeguards desig1wd 
to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which 
every defendant stauds equal befon the la\\,'' but nlso 
the expert advice necessary to recognize and take ad-
vantage of those safeguards. Gideon v. Wainwright 
supra, 372 U. S., at 344. In the now familiar words of 
the Court's seminal opinion in Powell v. 11labama, 287 
u. s. 45 : 
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of 
little avail if it did not comprehe11d the right to be 
heard by counsel. Eve11 the intelligent aud educated 
layman has small and sonwtimes no skill in the sci-
ence of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, 
generally, of determining for himself wlwther the 
indictment is good or bad. He is UJ1familiar with 
the rules of evidence. Left without the a1d of couu-
sel he may be put on trial without a proper charge. 
and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evi-
dence irrelevant to the issue or othrrwise inadrniss1-
ble. He lacks both tlw "kill a11d kncm ll·dg, ·ult• 
quately to prPJHll'P his ddP11S<' evr n though ill' may 
have a perfect oue. He requires t he guidi11g hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. 
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the 
danger of conviction because he does not know how 
to establish his innocence," 
12 
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Id., at 68-69, quoted in Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, 372 
U. S., at 344-345. 
Oregon's system for providing counsel quite clearly l 
does not deprive any defendant of the legal assistance 
necessary to meet these needs. As the State Court of 
Appeals observed in this case, an indigent is entitled to 
free counsel "when he needs it"-that is, during every 
stage of the criminal proceedings against him. -- Ore. 
App., at -, 504 P. 2d, 11t 1396. The fact that an 
indigent who accepts state-appointed legal representa-
tion knows that he might someday be required to repay 
the costs of these services in no way affects his eligibility 
to obtain counsel. The Oregon statute is carefully l 
designed to insure that only those who actually become 
capable of repaying the State will ever be obliged to do 
so. u Those who remain indigent or for whom repay-
ment would work "manifest hardship" are forever exempt 
from any obligation to repay. 
We live in a society where the distribution of legal 
assistance, like the distribution of all goods and services, 
is generally regulated by the dynamics of private enter-
prise. A defendant in a criminal case who is just above 
11 The limitation of the obligation to repay to thoRc who are found 
able to do so also di,;poses of thr argument, pretiented by an arnic'U8 
curiae, that revocation of probation for failure to pa~· cornstitut<>s an 
impenni~sible discrimination based on Wl'alth. See Tate Y. 8hnrt1 
401 U. S. ::l95; Williqms v. lllinoi&, :399 U. S. 235. A~ th(• Court 
stated. in Tate v. Short . suwa, "We emphasize that our holding 
does not suggest any con~titutional infirmity in imprisonment of a 
defendant with the means to pay a fine who rcfuties or neglects to <lo 
80." 401 U. S., at 400. 
Similarly, the wording of Oregon 's statute make::; dear (hat a de-
termination that an indigent "will br ablc1' to make subsequent n •-
payment i:, a condition nece8sary for tlw initial imposition of th" 
obligation to make repaymc•nl , but is no1 itself fl condition for 
granting probation, or even fl factor to be (·om;idrrcd in drtrrminmg 
whether probation ~hould he grantc'd . 
•.. 
' ,: 
. . .. 
I ' , . 
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the line separating the indigent from the nonindigent 
must borrow money, sell off his meager assets, or call 
upon his family or friends in order to hire a lawyer. We 
cannot say that the Constitution requires that those only 
slightly poorer must remain forever immune from any 
obligation to shoulder the expenses of their legal defense1 
even when they are able to pay without hardship. 
This case is fundamentally different from our decisions 
relied on by the petitioner which have invalidated state 
and federal laws that placed a penalty on the exercise 
of a constitutional right. See Uniformed Sanitation 
Men Assn., Inc. v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 280; Gardner 
v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273; United States v. Jackson, 
390 U. S. 570. Unlike the statutes found invalid in those 
cases, where the provisions "had no other purposC' or 
effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights 
by penalizing those who choose to exercise them," Un'ited 
States v. Jackson, supra, 390 U. S., at 581, Oregon's 
recoupment statute merely provides that a couvicted 
person who later becomes able to pay for his counsel 
may be required to do so. Oregon's legislation is tailored 
to impose an obligation only upon those with a foresee-
able ability to meet it. and to enforce that obligatiou 
only against those who actually become able to meet it 
without hardship. 
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May 7, 1974 
Please join me in your opinion in No. 73-5280, Fuller v. 
Oregon. I may decide to file a separate opinion. But whether 
or not I do so I am still with you. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
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MR. Jusnci; MARSHALi,, dil"sent.ing. 
In my view, the Orrgon recouprnc•nt f'\tatutr at issue in 
this case discriminates against indigent defoudants in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the prin-
ciples established by this Court in Jame.~ \ . Stranye , 407 
U. S 128 (H)72) . In that ca.-'<.' WI' held 11nco11stitutio11a.l 
under the Equal Protection Clause a K,lll!--HS recoupnwut 
statutr becausr it failed to prov1<.lc equal treatment 
between indigent ddendauts and other civil judgment 
debtors. We relied 011 the fact that indigent defendants 
were not elltitlrd to the protectivr exemptions Kansas 
had erectrd for other civil judgment debtors, 
The Oregon n•coupmrnt statute at issue here similarly [ 
provides un(•qual trPatmcnt betwcm1 indigent defendants 
ahu otiwr civ1r .111dgniellt debtors. l'he ma,,ority o6flis-
caies the 1ssm• in tl1is ease by focusing solely 011 tJ1e 
question wlwthcr the Oregon statute affords an indigent 
defendant the same protective exemptions provided other 
civil debtors. True, as collstrucd hy the Oregon Court 
of Appeals, thr statute• docs not discriminate in this 
regard. But the treatment it affords indigent defendants 
remains unequal in a11othcr, even more fundamental 
rc"°spcct. The important fact wh1eh the ma1ority ignores 
fs tlu{t ~ df'r Oregon law .. ti~- repayment of the• indi§._ent I 
dt>fendaut 's drbt to tlw HtatP ('fl.II hf rna1fi: a conditioH 
of n 1s probation, as 1t was 111 this ca::ic. 7.'cfatwn~r"'s 
------
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f@ ure to pay his debt can result in his being sent to 
prison. In this respect the indigent defendant in Oregon, 
likethe indigent defendant in James Y. Strange, is treated 
quite differently from ~lrnr civil ,judgment debtor&'\ 
l 
Petitioner's "predican~mclcr-Uus statute comeg 
into sharper focus when compared with that of oue who 
has hired counsel in his defense.'' 407 U. S., at 1:lS, 
Article 1, ~ 19 of the Ore~on Constitution provides that 
"Th£re shall be no im prisonment fo!:., c~ bt, excep t in cafil) 
of fraud or absconding del2tors. " Hrncc, the nonindigt>nt 
defendant in a criininal case ill OrPgon who Jors not pay 
his privately rPtamed rou ns<'l. Pvon after 11C' obtarns the 
means to do ~o. cannot h{· imprisoned for such failuru, 
The lawyer in that instance Jnll!'lt enforc<' his judg111<•11t 
through the 11ormal ro11t('S available to a creditor-by 
attachrnen t, lien , garnish llll'll t, or tho likr.. Pctition<·ri 
on th(• other hand, faces five years behiml bars 1f h<> fails 
to pay his "debt" arising out of the appointment of 
counsel. 
Article 1, ~ H) of tlw Oregon Com;titution is represent-
ative of a fundanH'ntal stat<• policy consistent with the 
rnockrn r<>jection of the practice of imprif-'onmcnt for rleht 
as u1111eces!'larily cruel and c'-sentially counterproduct1vc•, 
Sine<' OrP~on choos<'s not to provid1• imprism11ne11t for 
rlebt for wPll-hecled defendant~ who do not pay their 
retained counsel, I do not believe it ca.11. consistent with 
the Equal Protection Clause , imprison an indigent 
defendant for his failure to pa.y thccosts of lus appornte<.l 
cowirl' .For as~\\~ Jame.~ v~ Strange, a State 
3 The majority argtH'" that we ha,·r r<·<·o~11iz1•d no eon~tii11tional I 
infirmity in imprisoning a dd(•11dant with 1 he llll'flll s to pay a fiuc 
who refu~c.~ or 1wgl<'<'I~ to do :::.o Ante, nt - n. 11. Thi;: Wt' 
dors 1101 iuvolvc a fim·, hm,·<,,·c·r. b11t rnt hrr Pnforl'<'nwnt of a 
debt for !Pgal ::,ervH·c·~. Tlw fact l'l'lllai11~ 1 hat Orrgon impri~on» 
a def Pnda11t with appoint(•<! rollll::'<'i who rrfo"p" or m•i:d<'rt~ to 
1iay hi~ debt for lrgal S('J'Vi<'C~ CV('Jl tho11gh ·thh• to pa?·, Im( r!<w, 
-
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may not "impose unduly harsh or discrirnillatory terms 
solely because the obligation is to the public treasury 
n.1..ther than to a private creditor." 407 U. S., at 138. 
I would therefore hold the Oregon recouprnent statute 
unconstitutional uuder the Equal Protection Clause inso-
far as it permits payrn:ent of the indigent defendant's 
debt to be made a condition of his probation.2 I respec~ 
fully dissent. 
11ot imprison a defendant. with retained counsel in t!ie sanw 
circnmstanct's. 
2 In light of my di8po~it ion of thc0 equal proteet ion clitirn, I 
J1:we no ocra8ion to eonsif!er petitioner '8 contention that Home 
other defendant':; knowlc•dgf' that. he ma;\· have to reimburse the 
Stntr for providing him legal rrpre;;en1ation might impPl him to 
decline thr srrvicc~ of au appointed attorney nncl t,hus ehill hi~ 
Sixth Amendment. right to roun~d. In any evmt, in m:v \'iew 
8Uch a claim could more' appropriately be considered by this Court 
in the context of an actual case involving a defendant who, unlike 
petitioner, had rrfusecl nppointed cotmsel and rontendcd thn1 his 
refusal was not n. knowing and vol11ntary waivrr of hi~ Sixth Amend-
ment rights bel'at1~e it was bm,rd upon his fear of bearing the 
bmclrn of a debt for appointed counsel or upon his failure to undt' I'~ 
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~nvtttttt (qttmt ttf tltt 1tittittb ~htlts 
Jragltingto-n.1{1. <q. 2llffe'-l-, 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JusT1cE wt-1. J . eRENNAN, JR. May 8, 1974 
RE: No.73-5280 Fuller v. Oregon 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your dissenting 
opinion in the above. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
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.iu.prtm.e (!Jotttf ttf tlrt 'Jlittittlt j}fattg 
1llasifiugton, ~. (!J. 20ffe>t~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
May 8, 1974 
Re: No. 73-5280 - Fuller v. Oregon 
Dear Potter: 
I agree with your opinion in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to Conference 
\/ 
.. .. 
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Comments on dissenting opinion 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall'argues 
that the Oregon statutory scheme is discriminatory as 
between indigent defendants who may be placed "behind bars'' 
upon a fK.tllXa: failure to reimburse the state and "other 
civil judgment debtors". Infra at 1. The dissent singles 
out for comparison the "well heeled defendants who do not 
pay their [privately] retained counsel". Id. at 2. James 
v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) is relied upon in concluding 
that this "uneoual treatment" violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Reliance upon James v. Strange is misplaced. Both -
the Kansas statute there involved and the statute now before 
the ~ourt were designed to recoup expenses, including the 
providing of free counsel, incurred by the state on behalf 
of indigent defendants. Apart from this common purpose, 
the two statutory schemes for recoupment have little in 




statute provides broadly protective conditions which must 
be satisfied before repayment liability arises. Thus, rather 
than discriminate against indigent defendants as compared 
with other judgment debtors, Oregon imposes the repayment 
obligation only when it appears that the convicted defendant 
"is or will be able to pay them", and that payment "will 
impose [no] manifest hardship on the defendant or his 
innnediate family • • .'' Supra, at 5,6. Indeed, in view 
of the extent of the ppotection accorded by the Oregon 
statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Oregon, 
one wonders as to its practical efficacy. 
The dissent, citing the Oregon constitutional 
provision against imprisonment for debt, emphasizes the 
distinction between the ''cruel and essential counter-
productive" (infra, at 2) sanction of imprisonment and 
the normal remedies s.vailable for the nonpayment of civil 
' indebtedness. The dissent misappreciates the situation. 
This is a case in which imprisonment for contempt may 
result. It is not a ca.se of imprisonment for failure 
to pay for an indebtedness. There is no automatic 
3. 
remission to prison in the event of the failure by some 
specified time to reimburse the state for costs incurred 
on behalf of the indigent. The condidions above mentioned 
first must be satisfied as to ability to pay and absence of 
hardship; in addition the failure to pay must be "an 
intentional refusal to bbey the order of the court •• 
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 161685. Imprisonment for deliberate 
contempt of a court's order is hardly to be compared with 
imprisonment for indebtedness arising out of private 
contractual relationship. 
Moreover, in this case we have a probation order 
following conviction on a criminal charge, a.nd the 
reimbursement of the state - subject to the statutory 
protective provisions - is a condition of the probation. 
A sentencing court has broad discretion in imposing 
conditions on probation and such conditions customarily 
'impose restrictions and obligations on the convicted 
defendant which would be facially invalid if applied to 
free citizens.* In this case, the requirement that 
*ft.mong the most conunonplace of these, for example, is a 




indebtedness owed the state be repayed by respondent 
during the probationa.ry period, if and when the petitioner 




condition to the special status of probationee. 
The state has a legitimate interest, indeed perhaps 
a duty, to seek recoupment of taxpayer funds made available 
to indigent defendants if and when such defendants are 
able to reimburse the state. See James v. Strange, supra, 
at 141. The classification embracing such defendants 
is reasonable and in furtherance of the state interest. 
Such defendants constitute a class different in obvious 
respects from citizens not convicted of crime and who 
have no obligation to repay public funds. The dissent/ 
at"temptsto analogize between respondent and a defendant 
I\ 
who may be indebted to his privately retained counsel. 
The asserted analogy is in pt. Apart from the special 
I 
, protections afforded convicted indigents relating to 
I 
abilitro pay, which are not afforded the ordinary debtor, 
there is the special interest of the state in recovery 
of sums owed to it. See James v. Strange, id. at 137,138. 
The means adopted by Oregon for facilitating recovery 
cann,ot be said to be unreasonable. 
' . • 
·' 
May 10, 1974 
No. 73-5280 Fuller v. Oregon 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
lfp/ss 















.h}tu~ <qcmt of tqt ~ttittb' .ihttts 
Jbtslrht-gtctt. ~ - <q. 2!TffeJ.I..;l 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
May 10, 1974 
Re: No. 73-5280 - Fuller v. Oregon 
Dear Potter: 
I am glad to join your opinion for this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr, Justice Stewart 




THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
,ju.prmtt <4ourt of f4t 'Jnittb jitaftg 
~aslp:ttghtn. J. QI. 2n.;;'k, 
May 14, 1974 
Re: 73-5280 - Fuller v. Oregon 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
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